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Market failures in human capital investment and innovation explain the main
features of human development and economic growth. This is shown in a Schum-
peterian multi-country model with technology transfer and trade. Thus, only in-
stitutions expanding investments in nutrition, education, health, skills, know-how
and research in LDC’s, beyond what markets can supply, will succeed in promot-
ing long-term development. It is in the interest of leading countries to supplement
home investments with concerted transfers, since the long-term world growth rate
increases with world-wide knowledge levels and living standards. Underdevelop-
ment consists of a series of policy-dependent lower steady states, with parallel or
divergent growth rates, and with or without a human development trap. Free com-
merce raises the growth rate of countries able to support production at the global
scale. Smaller or more backward countries grow slower and require aid to emerge.
Skilled and unskilled workers in LDC’s have a conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s tb e t w e e ns u p p o r t -
ing innovation or human capital investment. If innovation is favored, the human
capital trap can persist, provoking opposition to globalization. If human capital
investment is prioritized, a switch to innovation will eventually be necessary, re-
quiring institutional change.Give a man a ﬁsh and you feed him for a day.
Teach a man to ﬁsh and you feed him for a lifetime.
Chinese proverb
1. Introduction
This paper describes the long-term relation between human development and eco-
nomic growth, in the light of a Schumpeterian theory of economic growth in an
open, global economy with technology transfer, trade and human development.
The theory implies that the political economy of countries with a human devel-
opment deﬁcit is characterized by a conﬂict of interests between its two classes of
skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers favor promoting technological inno-
vation (including technological adoption), while unskilled workers support human
capital accumulation (also resulting in poverty alleviation). The institutional and
organizational requirements of these two diﬀerent development policies coincide in
that both beneﬁt from promoting the autonomous functioning of the markets and
the eﬃciency of government expenditure (through public goods such as the rule of
law, transparency and accountability). However, they diﬀer in that they address
diﬀe r e n tm a r k e tf a i l u r e sr e q u i r i n gd i ﬀerent ﬁnancial and institutional solutions.
When technological innovation is pursued, the human capital trap can persist and
limit its success. When human capital investment is pursued, a change of tack to
technological innovation will eventually be required.
Diﬀerent policy choices (including autarchy versus openness) and diﬀerent lev-
els of market and government eﬃciency give rise to a series of diﬀerent steady
states in technological change, representing diﬀerent forms of underdevelopment.
The unskilled workers’ optimal policy results in a two-stage trajectory that ﬁrst
eliminates the low human capital trap and then embarks on technological change,
reminiscent of the history of ex-socialist countries. The skilled workers’ optimal
policy instead can result in the persistence of the human capital trap. Under
each of these policy regimes, market and government eﬃciency are important de-
terminant of whether divergence or convergence with the leading countries will
result. Free commerce (although not necessarily FDI)1 eliminates some of the
worst regimes that exist in autarchy, when incentives for innovation are too low
yet human capital investment is not pursued. Nevertheless, when incentives for in-
1Free commerce refers to the free trade of domestically produced goods, excluding foreign
direct investment (FDI). “Free Trade” policies usually includes the later, which generates inno-
vation incentives that must be accounted for (see Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).
2novation are higher but research has diminishing returns, countries lagging behind
too far, whose resources are unable to support innovative production at the global
scale, may have a lower growth rate under free commerce than under autarchy,
due to the loss of innovative sectors to foreign competition. Finally, from a global
point of view, development is not a zero sum game. Leading countries’ welfare
essentially depends on the world growth rate, which is maximized when the world
is fully developed. This can only be achieved if every country is endowed with its
share of leading technological sectors. Concerted technological transfer is in the
i n t e r e s to ft h el e a d i n gc o u n t r i e sa n dc a nb eab a s i sf o rp e a c ea n dp r o s p e r i t y .
As will become clear below, the model of development presented here describes
the interplay and trade-oﬀs between technological change and the dynamics of
human capital accumulation that make poverty persistent. In a simple way, it
explains the basic forces shaping the political economy of development, in partic-
u l a rt h o s eh a v i n gt od ow i t ht h er e l a t i o nb e t w e e ne c o n o m i cg r o w t ha n dp o v e r t y .
Hence, it provides the stage for a discussion of the role of institutions in develop-
ment. As Douglass North (1993) points out in The New Institutional Economics
and Development, “successful development policy entails an understanding of the
dynamics of economic change if the policies pursued are to have the desired conse-
quences. And a dynamic model of economic change entails as an integral part of
that model analysis of the polity since it is the polity that speciﬁes and enforces
the formal rules.” The model meets these requirements in general terms, and
provides a basis for evaluating institutional policies for development. Before this,
I summarize the model’s assumptions, mechanisms and results.
1.1. Schumpeterian theory of economic growth
Econometric studies at the cross-country level have concluded that productivity
diﬀerences are amongst the main sources of income diﬀerences.2 Another underly-
ing factor is human capital3 These two factors, technological progress and human
capital accumulation, are important determinants of capital accumulation. Thus
recent growth models often concentrate on just these two elements. An additional
2Studies attributing cross-country diﬀerences in per-capita GDP to diﬀerences in produc-
tivity, include Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993), Dollar and Wolﬀ (1994), Islam (1995),
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Klenow and Rodriguez Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall
and Jones (1999), Feyrer (2000), Parente and Prescott (2000), Easterly and Levine (2001),
Martin and Mitra (2001).
3Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1965), Frankel (1962), Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Romer (1990),
Mankiw, Romer and Weyl (1992).
3challenge has been to simultaneously explain the combination of the Great Di-
vergence of incomes occurring from the late 19th Century to the present day4,
and the rapid convergence in Europe5 and miracle convergence episodes in other
areas, such as East Asia, in the second half of the 20th Century. This unequal
pattern of economic growth can be accounted for in terms of club-convergence,6
modelling the concepts of development and underdevelopment as qualitatively
diﬀerent steady states.
The Schumpeterian analysis of endogenous technological change ﬁrst concen-
trated on R&D in developed countries as the source of economic growth (Aghion
and Howitt, 1988, 1992). A more general concept of innovation including tech-
nological transfer and adoption in a multi-country model can induce convergence
(Howitt, 2000) and can be used to address problems of development including
divergence. For example, the existence of a human capital threshold distinguish-
ing R&D from implementation can give rise to convergence clubs and explain
long-term divergence (Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). Institutional diﬀerences
reﬂected in ﬁnancial development can determine technological absorption rates
and also explain convergence clubs and long-term divergence (Aghion, Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). Foreign direct investment in the open global economy
giving access to cheap labor can give rise to asymmetric innovation incentives fa-
voring leading countries, as well as crowd out local innovation: these mechanisms
can explain persistent inequality and divergence between economies diﬀering only
in their relative status, without any assumption of increasing returns (Mayer-
Foulkes, 2005). The present paper explains the relation between human develop-
ment and economic growth in the setting of a global economy with technological
transfer and trade, and serves to generate the basic long-term policy alternatives
for development, as well as their institutional requirements.
The ﬁrst step in our Schumpeterian model puts together the arguments for
convergence into a basic two-country model incorporating free commerce. The ba-
sic mechanism works as follows. Free commerce makes home wages proportional
4Pritchett (1997) estimates that the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between the richest
and poorest countries worsened by a factor of ﬁve between 1870 and 1990. Similarly, according
to Maddison (2001) this gap grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998. The proportional per-capita
income gap between Mayer-Foulkes’ (2002) richest and poorest convergence groups grew by a
factor of 2.6 between 1960 and 1995, and between Maddison’s (2001) richest and poorest groups
by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.
5Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Evans (1996).
6Baumol (1986), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1993, 1997), Mayer-Foulkes (2002, 2003,
2005).
4to technological levels. Innovation in both lagging and leading countries, broadly
understood to include technological adoption, is costly7 and responds to the in-
centives for world proﬁts. Innovation investment aimed at achieving proportional
productivity jumps, which in principle are proportionally costly,8 obtains higher
than proportional returns in lagging countries, because of their access to the ad-
vanced contemporary knowledge of the leading countries (technology transfer).
This is Gerschenkron’s (1952) advantage of backwardness in technological change,
which constitutes a force for convergence. However, country-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in
size, human capital, policies and institutions can lead to persistent inequality and
divergence, if these aﬀect the incentives for innovation strongly enough. Lower
incentives for innovation will result in a reduced rate of technological change. If
these disadvantages are not too strong, at some point the advantage of backward-
ness will kick in and a stationary state with a ﬁxed technological lag will result.
Stronger disadvantages, however, will not be fully compensated, and will result
in a permanently lower rate of technological change than the leading countries’,
giving rise to divergent steady states. Thus marginal changes in parameters will
have level eﬀects at higher and growth eﬀects at lower income levels.
To model innovation under free commerce, an assumption about innovation
races must be made. The model makes a simple assumption, that winning sectors
are allocated in equal proportions by nature. This is a conservative assumption
in that lower human capital levels and the implied higher relative human capital
wages could adversely aﬀect innovation races and resulting in lower steady states.
A discussion of innovation is not complete without a discussion of the pres-
ence of market failures and the role of government. First, the very incentives for
innovation are monopoly proﬁts on an invention. This gives rise to huge players
in the international scene whose only counterpart in underdeveloped countries
may be the government. Competing with them and accessing the advantage of
backwardness through production for the world market may require solving con-
siderable problems of coordination and scale, negotiating technological transfer,
ensuring a coherent policy of self-interest, subsidizing infant industries, identifying
potential areas of success (by private or public agents), and so on. More basically,
implementing technological change often requires concrete public inputs, such as
7In his survey on international technology diﬀusion Keller (2004) ﬁnds international diﬀusion
is neither inevitable nor automatic, requiring domestic investments. Cohen and Levinthal (1989)
and Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2001) have also argued that R&D by the receiving
country is a necessary input to technology transfer.
8This is the ﬁshing out eﬀect.
5roads, railroad tracks, airports, the electricity distribution network, the “internet
superhighway”, new regulations, and so on. Moreover, a widespread fact about
innovation in the present day is that the social incentives for it are greater than
the private incentives. Consequently, policies promoting innovation have been
routinely applied in most if not all developed and recently developed countries.
In the model, we simply assume that innovative production has a public input.
Government promotes innovation by announcing some level of public inputs for
use in the production of successful innovations, determining their expected proﬁt
level. Such public inputs may include the maintenance of appropriate institutions
such as property rights if these are costly. Institutional arrangements promoting
innovation whose cost is negligible will be subsumed in a general ﬁxed productivity
eﬀect.
The next step is to incorporate human development.
1.2. Human development
The concept of “Human Development”, understood as an index of human well-
being including education, health and income, drew wide attention with the 1990
UNDP Human Development Report, which “addresses, as its main issue, the
question of how economic growth translates – or fails to translate – into human
development.”. This is one of the questions that the multiple steady states in the
present model will address. However, a more dynamic, long-term conception of
human development, and of its mutual interaction with economic growth, is our
point of departure.
Historical and macroeconomic studies have shown that health accounts for at
least one third of long-term economic growth,9 with continuing importance to this
day.10 These studies have uncovered momentous secular rises in stature, weight
and life expectancy that form an integral part of long-term human development.11
9Such studies include Nobel Prize winning historical studies by Fogel (1991, 1992, 1994[a],
1994[b]) for England over the last 200 years; Arora (2001) (for seven advanced countries using
100- to 125- year time series of diverse health indicators); Mayer (2001a), Mayer (2001b), Weil,
D. (2001).
10E.g. Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Barro (1996),
Knowles and Owen (1995, 1997), Bhargava, Jamison, Lau, and Murray (2000), Easterly and
Levine (1997), Gallup and Sachs (2000), Sachs and Warner (1995), Sachs and Warner (1997).
11Average stature rose from 164 to 181 cm in Holland between 1860 and 2002 and from 161
to 173 cm in France and Norway between 1705 and 1975. Average weight rose from 46 to 73
kg in Norway and France, 1705 to 1975. Life expectancy rose from 41 to 78 years in England
between 1841 and 1998; and from 29 to 60 years in India between 1930 and 1990. (Fogel, 2002;
6This line of research has concluded that the synergism between technological and
physiological improvements has produced a rapid, culturally transmitted form of
human evolution that is biological but not genetic, called by Fogel (2002) techno-
physio evolution. However, microeconomic studies, using a uniﬁed conception of
human capital including nutrition, health and education and measuring the impact
of adult health on productivity, have been unable to explain the historical magni-
tude of this impact.12 The appropriate explanation seems to emerge from a related
ﬁeld of study, the ‘gradient’ of adult health along income, which places childhood
health at the origin of the gradient.13 Thus, the intergenerational transmission
of human development plays a fundamental role. Underlying this transmission
of well-being are a series of market failures limiting human capital investment
on children and inducing vicious cycles or poverty traps, whose nature changes
as development proceeds. An example occurring at low levels of development is
the productivity trap due to low nutrition addressed by the eﬃciency theory of
wages,14 whose study has documented substantial eﬀects of nutrition on labor
productivity.15 At later stages, when education becomes important, low human
capital traps can occur through increasing returns or indivisible investments in
education.16 Other mechanisms that could lead to poverty traps in human capital
accumulation include: unequal inheritance of assets such as social capital, knowl-
edge, or early child development,17 child labor traps, and so on (Emerson and
Souza, 2003).
Human development can therefore be understood as an intergenerational process
Cervellati, Matteo and Uwe Sunde, 2003.)
12E.g. Schultz (1992, 1997, 1999), Thomas, Schoeni and Strauss (1997), Strauss and Thomas
(1998), Savedoﬀ and Schultz (2000).
13The large magnitude of the impact of early childhood health on schooling and therefore
on adult income is conﬁrmed by Case, Fertig and Paxson, 2003 in a study based on the 1958
National Child Development Study, which has followed all children born in Great Britain in
the week of March 3, 1958 from birth to age 42. These authors ﬁnd that ”controlling for
parents’ incomes, educations and social status, that children who experience poor health have
signiﬁcantly lower educational attainment, and signiﬁcantly poorer health and lower earnings
on average as adults”.
14E.g. Leibenstein (1957), Mazumdar (1959), Mirlees (1975), Stiglitz (1976), Bliss and Stern
(1978), Dasgupta and Ray (1984, 1986), Dasgupta (1991).
15For surveys see Barlow (1979), Martorell and Arrayave (1984), Strauss (1985), Srinivasan
(1992), Behrman and Deolalikar (1988).
16Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Durlauf
(1996), Benabou (1996).
17See Levinger (1992), World Bank (1993) and Van der Gaag (2002) for the importance of
early child development.
7of human capital accumulation, slowed by the presence of market failures limiting
the necessary investment, in which early child development plays a critical role.
The presence of the constituent elements for such a human development trap,
including the division of the population into two classes of families, is shown for
Mexico in Mayer-Foulkes (2004).
We model these failures simply, through the requirement for an indivisible,
or threshold, level of investment.18 We assume that in this process, both the
threshold investment and the resulting human capital levels are proportional to
the current technological levels. At lower levels of development, human capital
may be thought to be more intensive in nutrition and health, while at higher
levels education may become a more important component. In the model, when
human capital is scarce, unskilled labor wages are low. Under the assumption
that children are not creditworthy, only skilled parents, motivated by a degree of
altruism, can invest in their children’s human capital. Thus, children of unskilled
parents will be unskilled in the next generation. For simplicity, human capital is
the only inheritance, so in each generation the adult population will consist of two
classes of identical individuals, skilled or unskilled, so long as the trap holds. All
of the conditions are proportional to the technological level: what is constructed
is a relative poverty trap in which incomes can grow if there is technological
change, but inequality can nevertheless persist.19 This is consistent with the
extraordinary persistence of within-country inequality, at widely diﬀerent income
levels and growth rates.20 In the model, the government can supplement parental
income so as to make human capital investment possible. Once human capital
accumulation reaches a certain level, the unskilled labor wage rises enough for
every child to acquire human capital and the poverty trap disappears. Note that
now human capital is oversupplied. Given adults’ choice of skilled and unskilled
work, skilled and unskilled wages will equalize. The model is put in this way
by assuming that non-marketable beneﬁts of nutrition, health and education will
motivate parental investment in human capital even when skilled and unskilled
wages are equal. This assumption, which is realistic enough, is made for simplicity:
it eliminates an intertemporal cost-beneﬁt analysis for human capital.
18This is analogous to the threshold requirement in nutrition and health for education studied
in by Galor and Mayer-Foulkes (2002).
19Concurrent treatment of the demographic transition is beyond the scope of this paper. Its
theoretical link with subsistence levels requires an absolute rather than a relative treatment of
human development, planned for another paper.
20As Kanbur (2005) states: “There is no statistical correlation between changes in per capita
income and changes in inequality, taking countries as the unit of observation.”
8In the multi-country Schumpeterian growth model, the presence of a human
development trap decreases per-capita income through two mechanisms. The ﬁrst
is a lower market size reducing the incentives for innovation and therefore resulting
in a lower steady state. This
implies, as explained above, that inequality reduction will have growth eﬀects
at lower and level eﬀects at higher income levels. The second mechanism is the
reduction in per-capita income due directly to suboptimal levels of human capital.
Skilled wages will be relatively high while unskilled wages will be relatively low.
In the open economy case, the market size eﬀect is much reduced.21
1.3. Governance and policies
In the model, the state of governance is described by two parameters and by the
allocation of expenditure on two policy instruments. The ﬁrst parameter is a mea-
sure of ﬁxed productivity eﬀects including not only natural endowments but also
1) institutional arrangements aﬀecting the general eﬃciency of production and in-
novation such as the rule of law and other institutions promoting the autonomous
functioning of the markets, and 2) ineﬃciencies due to taxation. The second para-
m e t e ri sam e a s u r eo fg o v e r n m e n te ﬃciency in expenditure, including corruption.
These tow parameters deﬁne the eﬃciency of governance. Achieving optimality
in them is assumed to have negligible cost. This assumption, which may seem
unreasonable, is made for the following reasons. First, one of the arguments fa-
voring policies for market eﬃciency is that their cost is negligible compared to
direct government intervention in the economy. The model will qualify what these
policies can achieve in the face of market failures for human capital investment
and innovation. Second, the issues addressed here are the trade-oﬀs between
supporting human capital investment or innovation, rather than an analysis of
governance steady states. Nevertheless, in some of the steady states of the model
incentives for corruption will arise, which will be pointed out. Also, the presence
of a human development trap will induce social conﬂict, which can be understood
(albeit exogenously) to be counterproductive for governance.
The two costly policy instruments that complete the deﬁnition of the role of
government in the model are the support for human capital investment and inno-
vation that have been described. These are carried out subject to the governments
budget, which in turn depends on its expenditure eﬃciency.
21However, if research were more human capital intensive than production, an eﬀect eliminated
here for simplicity, an innovation disadvantage would remain.
91.4. Political economy of growth and poverty
Modelling a human development deﬁc i tt h r o u g ht h ep r e s e n c eo fap o v e r t yt r a p
naturally gives rise to a discussion of political economy, because of the implied
presence of two classes of people, skilled and unskilled. Two government objective
functions are deﬁned and their optimal policies compared. These are maximizing
the expected future wages for children of skilled and unskilled parents.22
For children of skilled parents, the objective function is next generation’s wage.
This depends positively on innovation and negatively on the aggregate supply of
skills. Indirectly, however, the supply of skills may have positive eﬀects through
its impact on innovation incentives. Children of unskilled parents will mainly
beneﬁt from a government lottery assigning human capital investment. However,
their future wage also has a positive impact from innovation. The unskilled will
prefer policies with a higher mix of human capital investment, unless the expected
beneﬁts from innovation are truly high.
Another way of putting this is the following. The unskilled will beneﬁtm o r e
form accessing currently available knowledge through increased skills than by
remaining unskilled and using new, higher technology.
Our analysis does not incorporate an endogenous policy choice. Instead it
assumes that one of the policies is dominant and examines the resulting steady
state.
1.5. The resulting steady states
Under autarchy, if the unskilled workers’ optimal policy is followed, the following
trajectory and steady state results.
Human capital accumulation, followed by divergent or convergent technological
transition. The lagging country will experience a transition to a steady state with
optimal human capital investment. At ﬁrst, this investment may be supported
exclusively. However, once the human development trap is overcome, government
support will shift completely to innovation. The ﬁnal steady state growth rate
will depend on the eﬃciency of governance. Divergent and convergent states are
both possible.
If instead the skilled workers’ optimal policy is followed:
Technological and human capital stagnation. For very low levels of popula-
tion, governance eﬃciency, or other ﬁxed productivity parameters such as when a
22Theses objective functions avoid the complexities of intertemporal optimization.
10country is land locked, the incentives for innovation will be insuﬃcient and there
will be no technological change. However, skilled workers will not favor human
capital investment since the additional supply will lower their wages. The growth
rate is zero. Any government revenue will best be spent on rents...
Relative human capital stagnation.F o ras u ﬃciently high combination of pop-
ulation, governance eﬃciency, and other ﬁxed productivity eﬀects, there will be
suﬃcient incentives for innovation. In this steady state, however, skilled workers
do not favor human capital investment. Divergent and convergent states are both
possible.
Optimal human capital investment. In this steady state, the development trap
no longer exists and government policy only supports innovation. This steady
state coincides with the ﬁnal steady state reached when the unskilled workers’
optimal policy is followed. However, it may be reachable following the skilled
workers’ optimal policy for exceptional situations with suﬃciently high popula-
tion, governance eﬃciency, ﬁxed productivity eﬀects, as well as initial level of
human capital.
Under free commerce, the world growth rate will rise if the leading countries
do not loose too many innovative sectors and their lagging partners are viable
enough to sustain parallel growth. The worst steady state, technological and
human capital stagnation, ceases to exist, because lagging countries access the
incentives for innovation available to the leading country, assumed to be positive.
All remaining steady states are still possible. The growth rate of countries not
lagging too far behind, whose government can support innovative production at
the global scale, with suﬃciently high governance eﬃciency and ﬁxed productivity
eﬀects to sustain parallel growth, will rise to the new world growth rate. Their
relative level to the leader will become closer the higher their static gains in ef-
ﬁciency due to comparative advantage; the smaller their market size; the higher
the advantage of backwardness; and the larger the share of innovative races won.
However, countries lagging suﬃciently far behind will not be able to support in-
novative production at the global scale and may be pushed to a divergent steady
state with a lower growth rate than in autarchy. The mechanism is the follow-
ing. Under free commerce, innovation races between countries reduce the sectors
available for research. When government support is squeezed into less sectors, and
under diminishing returns to research, the resulting growth rate (of technology
and therefore income) is lower. This result can produce multiple steady states
between identical economies, that is, independently of institutional and human
capital diﬀerences. It is analogous to the innovation crowding out occurring in
11the presence of FDI (Mayer-Foulkes, 2005)
Summarizing, according to the model the human development trap will re-
main in countries not systematically supporting human capital investment, inde-
pendently of the rates of growth achieved. This conclusion is consistent with the
facts of growth and inequality.23 It is based on acknowledging the market fail-
ures that exist for human capital investment. On the other hand, human capital
investment can only be prioritized until the optimal human capital investment is
reached. After this, technological innovation must be supported. The change in
priorities may be diﬃcult if governing interests have become entrenched.
The political economy implicit in the human development trap throws light
on why economic growth translates – or fails to translate – into human devel-
opment.
1.6. Institutions for economic growth and development
Institutions, understood as the “rules of the game of a society” (North, 1993),24
form the matrix in which its economy functions. “They are formed to reduce
uncertainty in human exchange. Together with the technology employed they
determine the costs of transacting (and producing).” (ibid) Institutions support-
ing developed market economies include property rights, the rule of law and the
protection of civil and political freedoms. Of course, developed societies include
a whole series of institutions, now understood to include organizations, covering
functions that the markets do not. Moreover, governance is suﬃciently developed
to regulate and impose constraints on the market when necessary, and to generate
resource ﬂows that may be required.
The magic of markets, as was recognized by Adam Smith, is that they generate
an autonomous form of human exchange possessing certain optimal properties.
However, markets do not always function, and institutions to make them function
c a n n o ta l w a y sb ef o u n d . 25 Thus the following principles for optimal institutional
23Anand and Kanbur (1993), Deininger and Squire (1996), Squire and Zou (1998), Kanbur
(2005).
24Citing this work, institutions “more formally are the humanly-devised constraints that struc-
ture human interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regula-
tions), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self imposed codes of conduct),
and the enforcement characteristics of both.”
25Curiously, the assumption of perfect markets in theoretical economic models tends to shift
the explanation of cross-country income diﬀerences towards the institutional context of the
models – and away from economic causes.
12arrangement would seem elementary:
1) Generate market institutions where markets apply. When organizations are
performing the role of markets, apply a pro-market reform. Solve suboptimalities
with as little intervention as possible.
2) Where markets fail to generate necessary investments or expenditures, the
necessary ﬂows must be generated in the least costly way, including the possibility
of public expenditure and government organization.
The criteria for these decisions are objective: Do markets apply eﬀectively?
Are there market failures? Are there missing investment ﬂows? What are the
institutional alternatives and their costs? These are, in principle, not questions
of conviction but of fact.
Do such simple considerations have a bearing on the institutional debate?
Unfortunately they do. Consider the Washington Consensus, ”... development
strategies focusing around privatization, liberalization, and macrostability (mean-
ing mostly price stability); a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith, stronger
than warranted, in unfettered markets and aimed at reducing, or even minimiz-
ing, the role of government.” (Stiglitz, 2004) According to our model, this is a
policy for technological and human capital stagnation, addressing the eﬃciency of
governance only vaguely, and promoting openness without an innovation policy!
Its meager results in both human development and innovation, for example in
Latin America since the late 1980s, or, worse, in the transition economies from
the former Soviet block, were almost warranted!
Even though the present model gives only a partial explanation of the persis-
tence of inequality and divergence in the open economy it nevertheless also helps to
understand the successful strategies pursued in East Asia, where the development
state took an active role. There, although human development was not ignored,
inequality was a minor problem, liberating resources for pursuing strategies for
innovation. These included dealing with problems of coordination, scale, infant
industry, and ensuring the achievement of technological independence (see Wan,
2005), counteracting innovation crowding out by FDI (Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).
The model also throws light on the poor economic performance of Africa. Sit-
uated at very low human capital levels, incentives for innovation are very low,
as are country resources to support production at the global scale, implying that
openness can reduce the growth rate in the face of international innovation com-
petition.
Underdevelopment may mostly be the consequence of market failures rather
than poor institutions. The main candidates are failures in human development
13and in technological transfer. Both are clearly insuﬃciently funded. The conse-
quences in human well-being are staggering. Development policy must somehow
induce these ﬂows of nutrition, education, health, skills and know-how for produc-
tion and research, that markets are not inducing. These ﬂows need not necessarily
pass through governments, but could be subcontracted through NGO’s or other
local or international competitive providers, or could take place through a series
of organizations designed for the purpose.
The model shows that overcoming the human development trap is the essential
component of pro-poor growth. In this sense, the Millennium Development Goals
form an integral part of growth policy, whose eﬀects must be conceptualized in
terms of the appropriate thresholds, and may be intergenerational. So are condi-
tional cash transfer programs such as Oportunidades in Mexico, which promote
human capital investment for the young.26 Empowerment of the poor falls in the
same category. Human development policy is an essential component to develop
the groundwork for equality and freedom. In its absence, globalization policies
face the opposition of the unskilled, as the model shows.
The model draws a sharp distinction between human capital and technology,
that may not be so sharp in practice, particularly in relation to adult workers.
An example of what this means is the following: micro skill transfer programs,
analogous to micro credit, for adults.
The model’s conception of innovation is of course abstract. Supporting in-
novation in practice requires an industrial policy, an agricultural policy, and so
on. Some experience is already available for conducting such policies eﬀectively.
Further study is needed, however, on how to promote technological transfer and
local know how as countries integrate with the world economy.
The model shows that the world growth rate is maximal when all countries
are developed. To achieve this, it is in the interest of the developed world that
underdeveloped countries achieve leadership in a good number of technological
sectors. This will need a helping hand. Leading edge research in local production
can be supported world-wide.
The Schumpeterian equivalent of Keynesian spending is the transfer of known
skills, production know-how, research, and even infrastructure, within and be-
tween countries.
26Perhaps parental employment could also be used as an instrument for ameliorating the
condition of children and breaking the human development trap, focussed for example in the
production of non-tradeables such as housing, urbanization and sanitation that increase country
competitiveness.
14The remainder of the article presents the model, and then a concluding dis-
cussion.
2. The basic framework
The Schumpeterian growth model is cast in a simple discrete-time framework fol-
lowing Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005),
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). The model
will cover the impact of human development on economic growth under autarchy
and free commerce. In the autarchic case there are m countries which make use of
each others’ technological ideas; once commerce is included, m =2for simplicity.
There is a continuum of tradeable general goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1], produced
with labor and human capital and used for consumption and innovation. Each
country has a population consisting of a continuum of individuals living for two
periods and endowed with one unit of skilled or unskilled labor services in the
second period. Generation t is born in period t−1 and numbers Njt,j=1 ,...,m.
We shall consider the population ﬁxed unless otherwise stated, so each adult has
one child
2.1. Human capital
In any given country at any given time t there is knowledge of production, of level
At, that is generally available. Children not receiving an investment in human
capital at time t − 1 will supply one unit of unskilled labor as adults. Children
receiving an indivisible investment in human capital costing ρAt−1 will obtain,
due to the externalities of research and production taking place at that time, At
units of human capital. As adults, they will be able to choose between supplying
skilled or unskilled labor, and will also enjoy some non-tradeable beneﬁts of being
healthy and educated. Each parent in generation t − 1 would like to educate her
child, but due to other pressing needs can only dedicate a maximum proportion
ηe of her income for paying the necessary investment. Children have no resources
of their own and are not creditworthy. If their parents do not invest in them, they
will not receive adequate health and education unless the government completes
from taxes the available parental funding (a proportion ηe of their income). Write
NL
t for the number of adults who did not receive an investment in human capital
and NH
t for the number who did (‘L’ for labor (unskilled) and ‘H’ for human
capital), where NL
t + NH
t = Nt. The aggregate supply of human capital at time
15t is NH
t At.
Assume the wages per unit of labor and human capital at time t −1 are wL
t−1
and wH
t−1. For any individual, let δ
H be 1 if she acquired human capital and 0
otherwise, and let δ
L =1−δ
H be the complementary indicator function. For any










Let ckt(i) i st h ea m o u n to fg o o di consumed in period k =1or 2 and time t,
and deﬁne




Optimization of expenditure implies ckt(i)=ckt. Thus the budget constraint for
parents is:
β





t+1 represents their decision on their child. Assume the human capital





Expenditure optimization again implies et (i)=et = ρAt. Parents will allocate
et =

0 ρAt > ηezt
ρAt ρAt ≤ ηezt
We assume that parents will educate their children whenever possible, because
of the non-marketable beneﬁts of health and education. However, when they are
adults, they will only work in a skilled job if this pays as well as an unskilled one,
so wH
t+1At+1 ≥ wL
t+1. If the supply of skilled workers is too high some of them will
work as unskilled workers and the equilibrium wH
t+1At+1 = wL
t+1 will hold.27
Our assumptions on parental preferences are summarized by the utility func-
tion











27The assumption tha everyone seeks health and education beyond its economic beneﬁts is not
only realistic but also simpliﬁes the model because parents need not perform an intertemporal
cost-beneﬁt analysis adding a further dimension to the dynamics.
16where I is the indicator function
I (x)=

1 x ≥ 0,
0 x<0.
Observe that et ≷ ηezt ⇔ 1
1−ηe (zt − et) ≶ 1
1−ηezt (1 − ηe)=zt,so parents decide
on education as stated.
The subutility function for consumption is intertemporally linear, so the real
interest rate is given by 1+r = β
−1.28 T h e r ei si n d i ﬀerence between consumption
in the ﬁrst and second periods so long as the discount rate occurs according to the
interest rate. Hence the amounts actually consumed in each period are determined
by what borrowing is demanded for human capital investment and innovation.
2.2. General goods, productivity and innovation
The economy has inﬁnitely many small producers who can produce any good i by








where Lt (i), Ht (i) are the amounts of labor and human capital used to pro-
duce good i,a n dϕ is a ﬁxed productivity eﬀect that may include institutional,
geographic and other factors.
Technological change is costly. At time t − 1,t h eith innovator may attempt
a technological jump of magnitude Γ > 1, so as to produce good i with labor
productivity ΓAt. To implement these innovations a public good promoting the
adoption of the innovating will be necessary. The level of provision of this public
good will determine the innovation jump Γ that will be feasible. In the autarchic
case, innovators will decide to innovate according to their expected proﬁt. In
the open case, this decision will be embedded in an innovation competition game
deﬁning who wins the race, she or her competing ith analogue in the other country.
When she succeeds (innovates), she will form a large national or world monopoly
which will be the ith incumbent ﬁrm at time t. Let µt (i) be the probability that
if she attempts to innovate she succeeds. Then:
At (i)=

ΓAt with probability µt (i),
At with probability 1 − µt (i).

28Linear utility implies people are indiﬀerent between investing in any country. Thus, by
assuming δ is the same across countries, perfect indirect (ﬁnancial) investment can be allowed
with no change in the analysis.
17Goods i for which an innovation has just occurred are produced according to













where Pt (i) is a public good necessary to produce the recently innovated ith good.
The larger the jump Γ that is being implemented by the innovator, the higher the
proportion of the public good Pt (i) that is needed for production. The need for
the public input in production function (2.3) is introduced to represent the role of
government in innovation policy. However, it also serves to simplify the model by
making aggregate labor demand neutral to the innovation rate. For this reason,
the ratio of public to private labor is set at Γ1−α − 1. Public goods are produced







t (i) and human capital HP
t (i). Suppose that the public sector uses
labor and human capital in the same (optimal) proportion as the private sector,


















Then the privately perceived production function for innovated goods is analogous







except that its technological level ΓAt is higher and society as a whole pays
(through lump sum taxation) for the labor and human capital inputs for the
public good.
The incumbent’s speciﬁc knowledge disappears at her death,29 but general
knowledge diﬀuses during production within each country, so next period’s shared
technological level is:
At+1 =( 1+µt (Γ − 1))At. (2.6)
29Alternatively, it could be assumed that by the next period her speciﬁc knowledge is outdated,
or that the set of general goods i ∈ [0,1] is irrelevant to consumption and innovation, having
been replaced through technological progress with a new set of general goods.
182.3. Consumer and producer optimization
The Cobb-Douglass subutility function (2.1) for consumption in each period im-
plies that consumers dedicate an equal expenditure to each good i. Since the
production function for all competitively produced goods i is identical and has
homogenous returns of degree 1 with decreasing returns in each factor, labor and
human capital allocation is identical across goods, so Lt (i)=LC
t , Ht (i)=HC
t .









,w h e r eεα = α
α (1 − α)
1−α .
Innovative producers face competition at this price, and a constant consumer ex-
penditure. Therefore they minimize costs by reducing production to the minimum
















Because of their higher technology, innovators save on labor and human capital













and the proﬁt rate per unit product is:
π =1− Γ
−(1−α) > 0
















and similarly for HP
t +HI
t = HC
t . As stated above, for simplicity the model is set
up so that the need for a public good supporting innovation makes the aggregate
demand of labor and human capital of innovative sectors equal that of competitive
sectors.
G o o d sw i l la l s ob ed e m a n d e df o rr e s e a r c h ,i nt h es a m ep r o p o r t i o n a ls t r u c t u r e
as for consumption, as will be shown below. Hence, all goods are produced at the
19same price and in the same quantity Yt (i)=Yt = Bt/pt,w h e r eBt is the aggregate
expenditure on consumption and research. Real aggregate demand Bt/pt depends
on whether the economy is closed or open. Observe that real wages per unit









Let Lt, Ht be the aggregate levels of labor and human capital at time t.
Since the level of production of innovative and competitive goods is equal across
sectors, and since aggregate labor and human capital demand is equal across
sectors, aggregate production is:
Bt
pt







In each country relative wages between skilled and unskilled labor are deter-










Because skilled workers with skill level At will not work for a lesser salary than
unskilled workers, wH
t At ≥ wL
t so Ht/Lt ≤ α/(1 − α). Hence given NH
t skilled
adults out of a population of Nt,






At,L t = Nt − Ht. (2.10)
In eﬀect, the economy is identical for all values NH













κ rises from low values of Ht/Lt until the allocation reaches optimality κ =1at
Ht/Lt = α/(1 − α).
202.4. The human development trap
Skilled parents will investment in their children’s human capital if their salary
can cover the costs, so ηewH
t At > ρAt,o rηeα(Ljt/Hjt)
1−α ϕ > ρ. We assume that
this is always the case, so based on (2.11) assume
ηeεαϕ > ρ.
O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,u n s k i l l e dp a r e n t sw i l ln o tb ea b l et oc a r r yo u tt h ei n v e s t -
ment if ηewL
t ≤ ρAt,t h a ti s ,i fNH
















Above this level the following generation will be fully endowed with human capital
and skilled and unskilled workers will earn the same. Below this level there will
be a human development trap and two classes of workers, unskilled earning less
than skilled.
2.5. Research
At the end of period t−1, production will be allocated between consumption and
investment in research. Introduce an index j for countries. Innovative ﬁrms will
have access to a knowledge level Ajt, resulting from the previous knowledge level
Ajt−1 and from the diﬀusion of the new knowledge level ΓAjt−1 at a rate µjt−1
during production. Let the R&D investment needed to obtain a technological





where research intensity Rjt−1 is given by the Cobb-Douglass production function:




Here Rjt−1 (i) is the quantity of good i used for research. It follows from the
common Cobb-Douglass kernel that consumption and research demand for goods
i are proportional. Investment in innovation uses each good in the same amount
21Rjit−1 = Rjt−1 and simply transfers some constant proportion from consumption
to innovation. In the research production function (2.13), the division by Ajt
recognizes the “ﬁshing-out” eﬀect: the resources needed to obtain a technological
jump Γ are proportional to the knowledge level. Suppose there is a single techno-
logical leader, country 1, and let ajt = Ajt/A1t < 1 be the relative technological
level of country j with respect to the leader. Lagging countries face an innovation
function identical to the one faced by the leader at previous levels of develop-
ment, except for the convergence term ψ(ajt). Through technological diﬀusion,
the presence of the leading country’s more advanced technological level A1t re-
duces the resources that country j needs to invest in order to achieve the same
jump Γ. This is Gerschenkron’s (1952) “advantage of backwardness”, represented
by a decreasing function:
ψ(ajt)=ψ0 − (ψ0 − ψ1)ajt. (2.14)
For the function Ψ yielding the ﬁnal probability of innovation (2.13) set
Ψ(n)=1− (1 + n)
−1 . (2.15)
This satisﬁes Ψ(0) = 0,Ψ < 1,Ψ  > 0,Ψ   < 0, Ψ  (n)=( 1+n)
−2 =( 1− Ψ(n))
2.
The fact that Ψ is bounded will allow examining the eﬀects of country size.
Innovators in each sector choose µjt ≥ 0 to maximize the expected real payoﬀ:
µjtπjt
(1 + r)pjt
















The eﬀectiveness of government and the general nature of its policies are char-
acterized in this model by several parameters. Two parameters cover aspects
designated here as having negligible cost whose level will not be optimized within
t h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e t .T h eﬁrst is a measure of ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ϕ in-
cluding not only natural endowments but also institutional arrangements aﬀecting
the general eﬃciency of production such as the rule of law and other institutions
22promoting the autonomous functioning of the markets. The second is a measure
of government eﬃciency in expenditure. Government expenditures will be based
on a lump sum tax of a ﬁxed proportion τ of income up to a maximum τmax > 0.
However, government will only deliver services with eﬃciency 0 < ζ ≤ 1,r e ﬂecting
problems such as corruption. Ineﬃciencies arising from taxation will be subsumed
in ϕ.
Besides these parameters we analyze two costly policy instruments. The ﬁrst
is the support of innovation. The government will guarantee the provision of a
proportion υt of the public goods necessary for the full supply of innovated goods.




t is the optimal level of public expenditure in each sector. Innovator
proﬁts will be reduced by a factor υt and the shortfall in production will be
covered by the competitive sector.
The second is an investment in human capital for children whose families do
n o th a v es u ﬃcient resources for the purpose. An expenditure EP







more children acquire adequate levels of health and education.
We assume this investment is assigned by a lottery implying all needy families
have some expectation of receiving the investment. Thus if a human development
trap is in place, so NH

















t = τζYt ≤ τ
maxζYt. (3.2)
The promotion of innovation will raise expected wages in the next period,
beneﬁtting both skilled and unskilled workers. When a human development trap is
present, human capital investment will be applicable and will beneﬁt the expected
wage of children from unskilled families, and raise the incentives for innovation
through raising the eﬃciency of production κ and therefore eﬀective market size.
However, it will lower skilled wages by raising the supply of skilled workers. If
the government budget is high enough, there will be no conﬂict and both policies
will be possible. Otherwise each class will support diﬀerent policy objectives,
evaluated below for the cases of autarchy and free commerce. If the government
is more corrupt, conﬂi c tw i l lb es t a r k e r .
234. Autarchy
Consider country j with no trade. As noted before, aggregate income in country




2 Ω(ajt)υjt =1 , (4.1)
where the eﬀective innovation incentives (corrected for the ﬁshing out eﬀect and
convergence) are:
Ω(ajt)=ψ(ajt)βπϕjκjεαNjt,
a decreasing function of ajt.D e ﬁne:









The function f solves (4.1), is zero for Ω ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing thereafter.
The innovation rate µjt (which must be nonnegative) is given by:
µjt(ajt,υjt)=f (Ωjt(ajt)υjt). (4.2)
4.1. Leading country
For simplicity I assume that leading country 1 is fully supplied with human capital
and has a suﬃciently eﬃcient government to fully support innovation. That is,
υ1 = ζ1 =1 ; µ1tP∗
1t ≤ τmaxY1t ⇔ τmax ≥ µ1tπ (since under our special labor
demand invariant construction π = P∗
1t/Y1t). I further assume ϕ1 =1 .I nt h ec a s e
of the leading country, a1t =1 , so the innovation rate is the constant:
µ1t = f (Ω1) where Ω1 = ψ1βπεαN1.
The population N1 is assumed to be large enough to imply Ω1 ≥ 1 and therefore







− 1=µ1 (Γ − 1).
(‘A’ for autarchy). gA
1 is increasing but bounded in the population level N1.









244.2. Lagging countries, no human capital investment
In the case of a lagging country, assume for the present that its government does
not invest in human capital, so that its relative human capital level NH
jt/Njt is
either (1) trapped at a level below nH
Trap, (2) lies on the interval (nH
Trap,α) and
will next period become 1, or (3) is already 1. (Recall that, by (2.10), NH
jt/Njt =
1 ⇒ Hjt/Njt = α.) On the other hand, assume that the government supports
innovation with its full budget τmaxζjYjt.D e ﬁne the function
V (Ω,υ)=f(Ωυ)υ.
Given Ω > 0, this is an increasing function of both its variables satisfying V (Ω,υ)=
0 for υ ≤ Ω−1. Expenditures in innovation support are GI = πV (Ωjt(ajt),υjt)Yjt
(recall P∗
jt = πYjt). For each Ω there is an inverse function υ(Ω,E) with values
above Ω−1 satisfying V (Ω,υ(Ω,E)) = E. The function υ(Ω,E) is decreasing in
the ﬁrst and increasing in the second variable. The maximum possible support











It is shown in Appendix B that for ﬁxed government expenditures although υΩ ≤
0, µjt is increasing in Ω(ajt).A l s o , w h e n ζj → 0, µjt → 0. µjt(ajt) is zero if
Ω(ajt) ≤ 1.









[1 + µ1 (Γ − 1)]Ajt
=
1+µjt(ajt)(Γ − 1)
1+µ1 (Γ − 1)
ajt.







1+µ1 (Γ − 1)
.
30The phase diagram can be viewed in the (ajt,a jt+1/ajt) plane. Trajectories are mapped
following the function HA
j (ajt) and then rectangular hyperbolas to the ajt+1/ajt =1line.









Country j converges in growth rates to country 1 if it tends to a steady state
HA
j (a∗
j)=1at which its innovation rate µjt(a∗
j)=µ1 equals the leader’s (with
a∗
j ≥ 0). A divergent steady state a∗
j =0occurs if HA
j (0) < 1, yielding a negative
relative growth rate for country j. If instead HA
j (1) > 1,c o u n t r yj will overtake
country 1 once it approaches it.
Observe that the functions Ω(ajt) and ψ(ajt) are strictly decreasing and contin-
uous, so µjt(ajt) is strictly decreasing when it is not zero (that is, when Ω(ajt) > 1).
If Ω(ajt) ≤ 1 then HA
j (ajt) < 1. Finally, HA
j (ajt) is continuous by construction.
Hence the solutions to HA
j (a∗
j)=1a r eu n i q u ei ft h e ya r ep o s i t i v ea n do t h e r w i s e
the steady state is a∗
j =0 . The relative technological levels ajt converge to steady
states a∗
j as t →∞ .
Proposition 1. Under autarchy, countries fall into four groups.
(1) HA
j (1) > 1.C o u n t r yj will overtake country 1.
(2) HA
j (1) ≤ 1 and HA
j (0) ≥ 1.C o u n t r y j converges in growth rates to
country 1. A unique steady state 0 ≤ a∗
j ≤ 1 exists given by HA
j (a∗









j (0) < 1. In this case the steady state is a∗
j =0 .C o u n t r y j diverges
in growth rates from country 1. The growth rate is ωjµ∗
j (Γ − 1) <g A







Marginal rises in productivity eﬀects ϕj, population size Nj, or human cap-
ital levels NH
jt/Njt, if they are suboptimal, will result in marginal positive level
eﬀects in case (2) and growth eﬀects in case (3). Similarly with the eﬃciency of
public spending ζj, when the government budget restricts its ability to support
innovation. (All proofs are in Appendix A) 
The dependence of steady states on human capital and innovation suppoty is
shown in Figure 1.
In the autarchic case, identical economies have the same steady states in-
dependently of their initial conditions, Galor’s (1996) deﬁnition of convergence,
which now includes “converging” to a divergent steady state. To study identical
economies, set ϕj = Nj = ζj =1 .
Corollary 2. Under autarchy,
26(1) Countries identical in parameters and human capital distribution have the
same steady states.
(2) If a country has a higher steady state, it must have better institutional
arrangements and productivity ﬁxed eﬀects ϕj,h i g h e rg o v e r n m e n te ﬃciency ζj,
a higher level of human capital NH
j /Nj, or a larger population Nj. The presence
of a human capital trap has a double eﬀect: it lowers the steady state a∗
j and the






Corollary 3. There are four kinds of steady states, according to whether they
diverge or converge in growth rates (HA
j (a∗) < 1 or HA
j (a∗)=1 )a n da c c o r d i n g
to whether they exhibit optimal human capital accumulation or a human devel-
opment trap (NH/N < nH
Trap or NH/N ≥ α; the intermediate stage disappears in
one generation). 
4.3. Lagging countries, optimal policies
By assumption, the leading country is not subject to a human capital poverty
trap. All of the population will be educated in their youth, although in their
adult period some will be employed in skilled and others in unskilled labor. Also,
enough public resources are available through taxation to support innovation opti-
mally. However, this situation need not hold in lagging countries. We discuss two
policy objectives corresponding to the two classes that are present when there is
a human development trap, skilled and unskilled workers. The strategies consist
in maximizing the expected wages for children of parents who this period are 1)
skilled workers and 2) unskilled workers (in which case the expectation is over the
government lottery for human capital investment). In the absence of a poverty
trap only the ﬁrst policy will be present. Both policy objectives are subject to the
dynamic equations (3.1), (2.6) and to the government budget constraint (3.2).
Omit the index for country j for the remainder of this section. The objective










27The objective function for unskilled workers is maximizing the expected wage






of becoming skilled as the result of the
government investment EP
t on human capital:
maxO
L













































T h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s :
υt+1µt+1πYt+1 + E
P
t = τζYt (4.4)



























Thus the problem can be analyzed in terms of the variables υt+1,NH
t+1.Note
that expenditures are increasing in both, so the budget constraint curves have a
negative gradient.
Let us understand ﬁrst the local behavior of the innovation and income func-
tions µt+1 and Yt+1.T h i so c c u r si nt w or e g i o n sI nR e g i o n1 ,µt+1 will be zero, due
to insuﬃcient eﬀective incentives for innovation. The watershed level of human









In Region 2, µt+1 will be positive and increasing in NH
t+1, since when human capital
increases so does the eﬃciency of production κ and therefore the eﬀective market
size. Consequently, Yt+1 will be constant in Region 1, while it will have positive
d e r i v a t i v e si nb o t hi t sv a r i a b l e si nR e g i o n2 .
When Yt+1 is constant, skilled workers’ wages are decreasing in their supply
NH
t+1, so they will not favor marginal human capital investments by the govern-
ment on the poor. Also, any promise for innovation support ωt+1 will be vain,
s i n c et h e r ea r en oi n c e n t i v e sf o ri n n o v a t i o n .A tl e v e l so fNH
t+1 for which there are
28incentives for innovation, skilled workers will clearly support them, since they will
raise Yt+1. Here, since rises in NH
t+1 will also raise the incentives for innovation,
it could be that the incentives for increasing the size of the pie Yt+1 would be
higher than the disincentives arising from the wage reduction that an increase in
the relative supply of human capital would bring.
The arrows in Figure 2.1 thus establish the derivatives of skilled workers’
objective function. Given the assumption that NH
t+1/Nt+1 does not worsen, an
improvement in next period’s skilled wages can only occur in Region 2. If the
initial conditions are situated in Region 1, with υt+1 =0 , NH
t+1 ≤ NH
µt +1,t h e
optimal marginal policy for skilled workers is conserving the status quo with no
spending at all, since human capital investment will reduce their wages, while
innovation support is not feasible.31 Marginal policies increasing wages can only be
f o u n di nR e g i o n2 ,w i t hυt+1 > 0, NH
t+1 >N H
µt +1.H e r eNH
t+1 rises with innovation
support and exceptionally, for high values of υt+1 and Γ,w i t hh u m a nc a p i t a l
investment. Turning to ﬁnite rather than marginal policies, given a suﬃcient
budget in some instances optimal policies may exist involving a jump from Region
1 to Region 2, that may secure a rise in skilled wages through innovation even in
spite of a rise in the supply of skilled workers. If the initial conditions are situated
in Region 2, however, skilled workers will always support innovation although
they may not have any further incentives to alleviate poverty by increasing human
capital.
How do the policy preferences of the unskilled compare with those of the
skilled? (Figure 2.2) First, they will always invest in human capital. Second,
they will almost always exchange some of the support for innovation preferred
by skilled workers for human capital investment, unless of course the budget is
enough to cover both needs completely. Skilled and unskilled workers would share
an optimal policy whenever it reaches optimal human capital investment, but there
are exceptional situations where it would be shared. These exceptional conditions
arise if corner solutions involving both the boundary constraint and the constraint
υt+1 ≤ 1 exist. It is shown in the proof of Lemma 4, however, that these can only
exist for unrealistically large Γ, that is, technological improvements averaging
more than 6% p e ry e a ri nt h el e a d i n gc o u n t r yf o r2 5y e a r s( o n eg e n e r a t i o n ) ,w h e n
α =1 /2. Γ would have to be larger still for α < 1/2, for example 9% for α =1 /3.
These statements are proved in the following lemma.
31This ‘status quo’ state clearly provides an incentive for corruption as an optimal use of tax
resources.
29Lemma 4.I fΓ is not unrealistically large, for any optimal policy for skilled
workers that does not reach optimal human capital investment, unskilled workers
would prefer a policy allocating more human capital investment. The conclusion
also holds for any Γ in situations where the government budget cannot sustain a
full support for innovation υt+1 =1 .
We now examine the steady states and trajectories that can result from follow-
ing the optimal policies for skilled or unskilled workers. Note that these policies
coincide once human capital accumulation has reached its optimal level.
Proposition 5. A lagging country with a positive government budget can be
in the following steady states.
1. If the unskilled workers’ optimal policy is followed:
(1.1) Human capital accumulation, followed by a divergent or convergent tech-
nological transition. The lagging country will experience a transition to a steady
state with optimal human capital investment. During the transition, human cap-
ital investment may be supported exclusively or may include some support for
innovation. The steady state growth rate depends on the other institutional
arrangements and productivity ﬁxed eﬀects ϕ a n do nt h eg o v e r n m e n te ﬃciency ζ.
T h eg r o w t hr a t em a yb el o w e ro rh i g h e rt h a nC o u n t r y1 ’ sw i t ha∗ =0or a∗ > 0.
If the lagging country’s parameters are the same as Country 1’s, it will reach the
same steady state.
2. If the skilled workers’ optimal policy is followed:
(2.1) O p t i m a lh u m a nc a p i t a li n v e s t m e n t . In these steady states the develop-
ment trap no longer exists and government policy need only support innovation.
(2.2) Relative human capital stagnation. This steady state correspond to states
in Region 2 when skilled workers have incentives for innovation but not human
capital accumulation.
(2.3) Technological and human capital stagnation. This Region 1 steady states
correspond to the status quo states considered above, with zero technological
change and zero human capital accumulation. They occur when there is a human
capital trap; human capital is too low for innovation, and the government budget
and/or eﬃciency is too low to reach Region 2, so there is no technological change;
a∗ =0 .
Steady states 2.1 and 2.2 may be convergent or divergent, depending on the
other institutional arrangements and productivity ﬁxed eﬀects ϕ a n do ni t sg o v -
ernment eﬃciency ζ as in case (1.1).
305. Free commerce
Consider two countries 1 and 2 trading domestically produced general goods, with
labor and investment immobile. Write at for a2t,a n dl e tϕ1 =1 ,s ot h a tϕ2 is
t h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of country 2. Assume also that country 1 has an optimal

















where this equation deﬁnes 0 < κ2 (H2t/L2t) ≤ 1,t h ee ﬃciency of labor in country
2 as a function of its human capital allocation H2t/L2t, relative to an optimal
allocation.
Goods will trade at the same international price which can be set at p1 =
p2 =1 , one per unit of good. Real wages in Country 1 and Country 2 remain
unchanged
5.1. Innovation
In the autarchic case a single innovator is assigned to the ith good in each country.
In eﬀect this abstracts from the problem of domestic innovation races. In the
multi-country case the problem of innovation competition must be addressed.
Since the concern is not with the particular nature of innovation races, but with
their long-term eﬀects on economic growth, I simply assume that nature assigns
a subset of sectors with measure ωj to innovators from country j,w i t hω1 +
ω2 =1 . Several scenarios can be examined with this assumption. First, identical
countries can be assigned ω1 = ω2. Alternatively, endogenous assignments ωj(at)
can be considered. Also, it may be thought that the human capital level NH
t /Nt
has positive externalities on the number of sectors for which research can be
performed, for example if the measure of innovators is reduced in the presence of
a human development trap, so that ωj = ωj(NH
t /Nt). We assume that if both
countries fully support innovation, then each sets ω1 = ω2 = 1
2, dividing sectors
equally between countries. In particular, if lagging Country 2 sets ω2 < 1
2,t h e n
we assume Country 1 has the resources to set ω1 =1− ω2 > 1
2.A ss o o na st h e
government in Country 2 announces support for a set of sectors with ω2 = 1
2,
these are recuperated for Country 2.
315.2. Production, consumption and commerce
As before, goods are consumed in equal aggregate quantities Yt and at the same
price pt.N o t en o wt h a tYjt is given by (2.9) (incorporating index j), while aggre-










The assumption of trade balance is implicit in the model. Each country consumes
each good in proportion to its income. Recall real proﬁts in each innovative sector
are πjt/pt = πυjtYt, where υjt is the proportion of optimal production that can
be produced given government support for its production in country j.
Suppose that as a result of the innovation process each country j has innovated
on a measure ωjµj ≥ 0 of sectors. In each of these sectors there is government
support for producing a proportion υjt of world demand, and the remainder must
be produced competitively. Since the government will not support more innovative
production than can be produced in its own country,
ωjµjtυjtYt ≤ Yjt. (5.2)
If any capacity remains (expressed as a remaining supply of labor and human


























− υ2tω2µ2t ≥ 0. (5.4)
Observe that ξjt cannot both be zero simultaneously because υ1tω1µ1t+υ2tω2µ2t <
ω1+ω2 =1 .W h e nξjt =0we say country j is specialized in producing innovated
goods.
325.3. The two-country dynamics
The eﬀective innovation incentives in (4.1) are:





t N1t + ϕ2κ2N2t

. (5.6)
Hence the innovation rates are µjt(at,υjt)=f(Ωjt(at)υjt).W h i l ef (·) and Ω1t (·)
are increasing functions, Ω2t (·) is decreasing. Thus µ1t is an increasing and µ2t (·)
ad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fat. υjt must meet two criteria: the implied support is
within the government budget
µjtυjtπYt + E
P
jt = τjζjYjt, (5.7)
and the implied production is feasible, as expressed in (5.2). Given these condi-










As in the case of autarchy, assume ﬁrst that the government does not invest
in human capital. On the other hand, assume that the government supports
innovation to the fullest in view of its budget τmaxζ2Y2t.T h e nυjt is the maximum







,υjt ≤ 1. (5.9)





















gives the combination of parameters that is the stronger constraint: government
resources or economy size.32
32If we take the realistic values τj ≤ 0.3, π =0 .3 (implying α = .42222 for Γ =1 .025),
then since ζjωj < 1 it will be government support rather than economy size that is the binding
constraint.




,w h i c hw ea s -
sume. We also assume that it always has incentives for innovation, independently
of the size of Country 2, so ψ1βπεαN1t > 1.
For Country 2, though, for small enough at, government support υ2t will be-
come bounded by government resources or economy size, independently of Coun-
try 2’s relative size, eﬃciency (in institutions, ﬁxed eﬀects or spending), and hu-
man capital levels, because as at → 0 z2/(1+N1t/(ϕ2atκ2N2t)) → 0 so υ2t(at) → 0.
Country 2’s small-sized economy will be unable to support innovative production
at the global scale. Let aMin be the minimum level of at at which υ2t(at)=1and
Country 2 becomes constrained.
Country 2’s relative technological dynamics are now completely determined,
by substituting υ1t =1and υ2t = υ2t(at) in (5.8).
By construction, functions µF
1t (at), µF
2t (at) are continuous. When they are
non-zero, either µF
1t (at) is strictly increasing or µF
2t (at) is strictly decreasing, or
both. So long as at ≥ aMin,s oυ2t =1 , since both innovation rates cannot be zero,
HF (at) is strictly decreasing and there is a unique solution for HF (a∗)=1 ,g i v e n
by the solution to ω2µF
2t (at)=ω1µF
1t (at).
If at <a Min,s oυ2t < 1,t h e nυ2t(at) is an increasing function so the possibility
of multiple steady states arises. For small values of at, government expenditures





(see Appendix B), hence
lim
















On the other hand
µ
F











1t(0)(Γ−1). There is a steady state a∗ =0if
ψ1βπεαN1t > 1+2 z2ψ0βπεαϕ2κ2N2t, (5.10)
which holds for small enough z2, ϕ2, κ2 or N2t.
Summarizing our results, Proposition 1 carries over for the case of free com-
m e r c ea sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 6. Suppose that Country 1 has incentives for innovation in-
dependently of the size of Country 2; that Country 2 does not invest in human
capital, dedicating all of its public resources to supporting innovation. Under free
commerce, Country 2’s relative technological level at converges to three types of
situations.
(1) HF (1) > 1. If its initial conditions are suﬃciently high (for example if
a0 ≥ aMin) Country 2 will overtake Country 1, which falls into one of the steady
states described below, after the country roles are reversed.
(2) Country 2 converges to a steady state a∗ > 0 (for which HF (a∗)=1 ),
sharing Country 1’s growth rate. This solution is unique in the interval [aMin,1].
(3) Country 2 converges to a steady state a∗ =0with a lower growth rate than
Country 1. A necessary condition is (5.10). When for Country 2 z2 = τjζj/π <
1/ω2, its resulting innovation rate µF
2t (0) i st h es a m ea si nt h ea u t a r c h i cc a s e .
However now ω2 =1 /2 rather than 1, so the growth rate of its knowledge level
At, and therefore its growth rate, is less. 
Countries with identical parameters need not have the same steady state, if z
is small enough, since then a low enough initial condition implies converging to
case (3) above.
On the interval [aMin,1], if a country has a higher steady state, one of the fol-
lowing must be higher: institutional arrangements and productivity ﬁxed eﬀects
ϕj,g o v e r n m e n te ﬃciency ζj, or human capital level NH
j /Nj. As before, the pres-
ence of a human capital trap has a double eﬀect: it lowers the steady state a∗
j and
the eﬃciency of production κj.W h e nb o t hc o u n t r i e sc a na ﬀord full support for
innovation, population levels Nj aﬀect the global growth rate but not the steady







∗) ⇔ Ω1t (a
∗)=Ω2t (a
∗) ⇔ ψ1at = ψ(at).
Finally, observe that divergent countries at a∗ =0will probably loose innova-
tion races, since they have a lower innovation rate µF
2t,a n dt h e r e f o r ew i l lt e n dt o
ﬁnd their ω2 further diminished, lowering their growth rate.
35The result here shows, more generally, that when innovative production at the
global scale can only be supported with resources proportional to country income,
divergence may follow. In this type of situation, countries suﬃciently small an far
behind cannot catch up on their own. One form of aid could be infrastructure.
5.4. Optimal policy
We maintain the same objective functions as before. Government policy decisions
are very similar to those described for autarchy, with the following diﬀerences.
Region 1 disappears, because since Country 1 has incentives to innovate so does
Country 2, even when its budget for innovation support is small. Raising the
human capital ratio continues to raise the incentives for innovation. This eﬀect
could be smaller, since it happens through increasing the size only of the home
market, or larger, since it may occur at lower research levels and therefore at
higher returns to research. Nevertheless, Lemma 4 continues to hold, allowing
even larger Γ (see the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A).
We can now examine the steady states and trajectories that result from follow-
ing the optimal policies for skilled or unskilled workers under free commerce. Note
again that these policies coincide once human capital accumulation has reached
its optimal level. The free commerce version of Proposition 5 is the following
Proposition 7. A lagging country with a positive government budget can be
in the following steady states.
1. If the unskilled workers’ optimal policy is followed:
(1.1) Human capital accumulation, followed by divergent or convergent techno-
logical transition. The description of this trajectory is analogous to the autarchic
case except that Region 1 does not exist.
2. If the skilled workers’ optimal policy is followed:
(2.1) O p t i m a lh u m a nc a p i t a li n v e s t m e n t . In these steady states the develop-
ment trap no longer exists and government policy need only support innovation.
(2.2) Relative human capital stagnation. This steady state correspond to states
in Region 2 when skilled workers have incentives for innovation but not human
capital accumulation.
Steady states 2.1 and 2.2 may be convergent or divergent, depending on the
other institutional arrangements and productivity ﬁxed eﬀects ϕ a n do nt h ec o u n -
try resource parameter z2.
366. Free commerce versus autarchy
When is free commerce better than autarchy? Although the model presented
here focuses on the interaction between trade and innovation, trade theory also
emphasizes the eﬃciency gains due to comparative advantage. To include these,
suppose that when countries engage in trade the ﬁxed productivity eﬀects increase
from ϕj (now ϕA
j )t oϕF
j .
Suppose country 1 has incentives to innovate independently of whether it






























Country 1 must not loose too many innovation sectors to country 2.













Suppose that a∗F >a Min, so that Country 2 can fully support innovation.. Since
it converges in growth rates, Country 2 will beneﬁtf r o mf r e ec o m m e r c ei fC o u n t r y
1 does. Turning to its relative level, if ω1 = ω2, the steady state will occur at a∗F

























































37The beneﬁt so ff r e ec o m m e r c ei n c r e a s et h ew o r s et h ea u t a r c h i cr e l a t i v ei n e ﬃciency
of country 2; the smaller its market size relative to country 1’s; the higher the
advantage of backwardness; and the larger the innovation share ω2/ω1.
However, when Country 2’s support for innovation is constrained, and at tends
to a divergent steady state, the resulting growth rate is less under free commerce
than under autarchy due to sectoral competition reducing ω2 (see Proposition 6,
part 3).
6.1. Optimal world growth rate
The highest world growth rate will occur with the largest market incentives, that
is for the highest N1t + ϕ2a∗κ2N2t. Supposing all countries are equally eﬃcient,
this implies a∗ =1and κ2 =1 . Country 2 must not be lagging behind and
it must have an optimal level of human capital. To reach a∗ =1 ,i to fc o u r s e
requires ω2 = ω1.I ne ﬀect, both countries together will now form a single leading
country with a higher growth rate due to a larger market. proportional to a higher
population N1t + N2t,
g
F
1* = f (ψ1βπεα (N1t + N2t))
Country 1’s long-term welfare is improved when Country 2 fully catches up.
Note to the contrary that when Country 2 diverges and a∗ =0 ,t h ew o r l d
growth rate reduces to the autarchic growth rate, given Country 1 wins innovation
r a c e si na l ls e c t o r sa n dω1 =1 .
7. Conclusions
Market failures in human capital accumulation and in technological change and
innovation are a generally accepted fact. The Schumpeterian growth model pre-
sented here shows that these two hypotheses are suﬃcient to explain the long-term
relation between human development and economic growth. The model’s diverse
steady states are consistent with the broad physiognomy of economic growth:
widely varying incomes and growth rates, episodes of miracle growth (understood
as transitions between steady states), economic growth without inequality reduc-
tion, positive and negative impacts of trade on growth, convergence to parallel
growth paths of a large group of countries, long-term divergence and stagnation.
An extension of the model would also account for the demographic transition.
The inherent political economy of the model includes regimes characterized by
38corruption and stagnation, persistent inequality with intermediate levels of in-
come, as well as development. The model also describes, in broad terms, the
change in regime that the socialist countries required after their great successes in
human capital formation. This involved a change of institutions that had become
entrenched in the process.33 The model shows how the combination of variables
describing country states, namely governance eﬃciency and other productivity
ﬁxed eﬀects, government expenditure eﬃciency, human accumulation levels, as
well as human capital and innovation policies, together deﬁne steady state mem-
bership, and within that, growth rates or relative levels. At low levels of income,
changes in these parameters lead to growth eﬀects, while at high income levels
they lead to level eﬀects. Finally, the model shows that small countries lagging
too far behind may not be able to emerge on their own.
Thus, by and large, the impact of these market failures explains the main
features of economic growth. Let us agree that market forces are strong and in
many situations unstoppable, and that their forces gave rise to modern economic
growth and development – to understand that if they fully dominated the global
scenario, more equilibrium and convergence would be observed. Institutions and
policies for development must be two-pronged: they must promote healthy market
functioning and governance – and also address the main market failures. This
means that funding ﬂows for early child development, nutrition, education, health,
skills, production know-how and research, must be induced.
The assumption, in theoretical economics, that markets are perfect, leads to
the conclusion that the problems lie with institutions. This non-sequitur is a not
inconsiderable source of the institutional debate. Instead, methodologies must be
developed to evaluate both the assumption and the conclusions. Policies, on the
other hand, must reach a judicious mix between enhancing, complementing, or
substituting market functions. The implicit institutional arrangements range from
generating property rights and a state of law, through regulation and taxes, to
providing public goods and funding programs. When active policies are necessary,
t h e s en e e dn o tb ep e r f o r m e db ya ni n e ﬃcient central authority; instead, funding
and organizational strategies can be used to develop local initiative, governance,
capabilities and rights – as well as human capital and productivity. What are
needed are institutions to perform what the market does not. The precise form
these take is not so important, and can adapt to other objectives including eﬃ-
33The mainstream populations in the developed world probably emerged from the human de-
velopment trap during the Post War era. The neoclassical revolution and partial dismantlement
of the welfare state that followed can be interpreted as a similar change of regime.
39ciency, so long as the missing investments ﬂow. Conversely, institutional policies
not generating these ﬂows will fail.
Development is not a zero-sum game. Dismantling the human development
trap will generate large economic forces for world growth, and will reduce conﬂict
both within and between countries. The incentives for innovation, and therefore
the world growth rate, will be maximized when all countries are developed. It is
in the economic interest of leading countries to foster productive and innovative
capabilities around the world. The transfer of skills, know-how, research and
infrastructure, within and between countries, is an instrument for prosperity and
peace.
408. Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Everything is clear except for the derivation of the growth
rate when a∗










HA (0) − 1 = ωjµ∗
j (Γ − 1) <g A
1 . 
Proof of Corollary 2. (1) Since country j is identical to country 1, HA
j (1) =
HA
1 (1) = 1, so the unique steady state is a∗
j =1 . (2) This follows from Proposition
1. 
Proof of Corollary 3. This is clear. 
Proof. of Lemma 4. If the optimal policy is conserving the status quo in Re-
gion1, unskilled workers will prefer investing in human capital as much as possible
(some spending is possible due to the assumption ζτmax > 0), and possibly even
support some spending on innovation. If the optimal policy for skilled workers
lies in Region 2, the discussion above implies υt+1 > 0. Suppose υt+1 < 1,s o
that its level is dictated by a budget constraint, and consider alternative policies
using the same budget. The derivative of OH
jt along the budget constraint is zero.
Since the constraint curve has a negative gradient, it is possible to increase NH
jt+1
while decreasing ωt+1.N o t et h a tt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fOL
jt along the budget constraint
equals that of OL
jt+1 − OH



















































jt+1 and therefore OL
jt+1 increases along the budget constraint when
NH
jt+1 is increased and υt+1 is decreased. Unskilled workers would spend more on
poverty alleviation and less on innovation. If instead υt+1 =1and the budget is
not a constraint, that is, for the skilled it would be counterproductive to invest
in more human capital, then again the derivative of OH
jt along υt+1 =1is zero
and the same argument will prove that OL
jt has a positive derivative towards more
41human capital investment. However, if the optimal solution for OH
jt is a corner
solution on the intersection of υt+1 =1and the budget constraint, it is conceivable
that this solution is optimal for OL
jt as well. This exceptional situation requires
the following conditions:
1) If more resources were available, skilled workers would beneﬁtf r o mah i g h e r
investment in human capital through its returns to innovation.
2) If more innovation support were available, both skilled and unskilled workers
would beneﬁt from a higher investment in innovation rather than human capital.
We show here that 1) is not possible if Γ is not unreasonably large, since then
dOH
t /dNH
t+1 ≤ 0. In fact, 2) may provide a more stringent condition, at the cost,
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dx ≤ 0 for all values of x and υt+1 for which Ω(at) ≥ 1.I f i n s t e a d
Ω(at) < 1,t h e nf =0and clearly
dOH
t
dx ≤ 0. The inequality is stricter in the
autarchic case.
For the comment preceding the Lemma, set ω =1 . Applying calculus to
obtain the upper bounds (8.1), at α =1 /2,t h em a x i m u mi sa tx =0 .19098 and
the bound is Γ ≤ 4.3302. Visual examination of the plot of Γ’s bound shows
this is decreasing in α, so this estimate holds for α ≤ 1/2. If one generation is
equivalent to a period of 25 years, the ﬁrst bound is reasonable if one believes
possible technological improvements average less than 6% p e ry e a r . F o rs m a l l e r
ω, as in free commerce, the bound is less stringent. For example if ω =1 /2, Γ
need only average less than 8.5% per year. 
Proof of Proposition 5. At the steady states, human capital accumulation is
invariant.
1. Since the unskilled workers’ optimal policy always includes some human
capital investment, its optimal level will eventually be reached. This may be a
convergent or divergent steady state, according to parameters ϕ, ζ (see Corollary
3).
2. Since the skilled workers’ optimal policy may leave human capital levels
stagnant, the four types of steady states in Corollary 3 are possible. Human
capital may be trapped in Region 1, with zero technological growth, steady state
2.3; or it may be trapped in Region 2, with a convergent or divergent growth rate,
steady state 2.2; or it may be reach optimal levels, steady state 2.1, also with a
convergent or divergent growth rate. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Everything is clear except for the last sentence of (3).


























43for ω ≥ 1
2 since then Z
(ω+Z)ω < 1
ω ≤ 2. H e n c et h ef r e ec o m m e r c eg r o w t hr a t ei s
less than the autarchic growth rate. This is because dedicating research to less
sectors involves decreasing returns to research. 
Proof of Proposition 7. At the steady states, human capital accumulation is
invariant.
1. Since the unskilled workers’ optimal policy always includes some human
capital investment, its optimal level will eventually be reached. This may be a
convergent or divergent steady state, according to Country j’s parameters.
2. Since the skilled workers’ optimal policy may leave human capital levels
stagnant, the four types of steady states described in Corollary 3 are possible.
Human capital may be trapped in Region 2, with a convergent or divergent growth
rate, steady state 2.2; or it may be reach optimal levels, steady state 2.1, also with
a convergent or divergent growth rate. 
9. Appendix B
For ﬁxed government expenditures ωf(Ωυ)υ = E,( ω =1in the autarchic case)
0=f















⇒ µΩ = −f(Ωυ)υΩ > 0
On the other hand, the derivative of υ with E is given by:
ωf
 (Ωυ)ΩυEυ + ωf(Ωυ)υE =1 ,
⇒ υE =( ωf
 (Ωυ)Ωυ + ωf(Ωυ))
−1





Also an increase in government support υ implies µυ = ωf (Ωυ)Ω > 0.
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Figure 1. Examples of steady states for the relative technological level The thick 
curve represents equilibria a*(L
H/N,ν) for fixed human capital levels L
H/N and 
innovation support levels ν. A human capital trap exists for human capital levels 
below n
H
Trap, At this level the next generation jumps to optimal human capital 
level α. Increases in human capital levels shift the horizontal lines up, while 
increases in innovation support shift the equilibria a* to the right. a*0 is a 
divergent and a*1 a convergent steady state with a human development trap. a*2 
is a convergent steady state with optimal human capital.  
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Figure 2.1. Examples of gradient arrows for skilled wages 
H
t w . When human 
capital level is below  N N
H
t / 1 , + µ  (Region 1, a segment) there are no incentives 
for innovation, and skilled workers do not favor human capital investment for 
the unskilled. Above this level (Region 2, a rectangle), for a sufficient level  t υ  
of innovation support, human capital investment for the unskilled could be 
supported. The diagonal lines are budget constraints. The human capital level 
N L
H
t /  lies somewhere on the vertical axis and can only rise. Skilled workers 
will invest mainly in innovation, or possibly not at all, if initial  N L
H
t / l i e s  i n  
Region 1 and the budget is small. 
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Figure 2.2. Examples of gradient arrows for unskilled wages 
L
t w . Regions 1 and 
2, and budget constraints, as in Figure 2.1. The human capital level  N L
H
t /  lies 
somewhere on the vertical axis and can only rise. Unskilled workers will always 
have an incentive to invest in human capital, until the human development trap 
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